Criminal Defamation via Truthful Statements Under Korean Law

By Juwon Kang, July 7, 2026

The Big Picture

1. Overview

Article 307(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “a person who publicly states a fact and thereby defames another is punished by imprisonment with or without labor for up to 2 years, or a fine of up to KRW 5 million” (Criminal Act, Article 307(1)). That is, the offense of defamation may be established even where the fact stated is true. However, not every act of stating a fact is punished; it is punished only where the following requirements are satisfied and there is no ground excluding unlawfulness.

2. The Requirements for Establishing Defamation by Stating Facts

A. Publicity

This means a state in which an unspecified or large number of persons can perceive it. It is not necessary that an unspecified or large number of persons perceive it simultaneously; even where a fact was spread individually to only one person, publicity is recognized if there is a possibility of its being propagated from that person to an unspecified or large number of persons (Suwon District Court, Feb. 17, 2021, 2020gojeong636; Busan District Court, Jan. 28, 2016, 2015no3386).

B. The statement of a fact

The “statement of a fact” is a concept opposed to an “expression of opinion” whose content is a value judgment or evaluation; it means a report or statement about a concrete past or present factual relationship in time and space, whose content can be proved by evidence (Suwon District Court, Feb. 17, 2021, 2020gojeong636; Seoul Central District Court, Apr. 4, 2023, 2022gojeong1586). It is not limited to a direct expression of a fact; even by an indirect or roundabout expression, if it implies the existence of a fact in light of the overall purport of the expression and thereby has the possibility of infringing a particular person’s social worth or evaluation, it constitutes the statement of a fact (Seoul Northern District Court, Dec. 6, 2023, 2023gojeong320).

C. Concreteness

The fact stated must have concreteness to the degree that a particular person’s social worth or evaluation has the possibility of being infringed (Supreme Court, June 28, 1994, 93do696; Supreme Court, Feb. 25, 2000, 98do2188; Supreme Court, Oct. 25, 1994, 94do1770).

D. Intent

The criminal intent as the subjective element of the offense of defamation is satisfied by the actor’s perceiving the fact that gives rise to the result of infringing the victim’s honor; conditional intent that tolerates such a result also suffices, and it is not necessary that the actor actively desire defamation or even have such a purpose (Gwangju District Court, May 9, 2024, 2023no1035).

3. The Ground Excluding Unlawfulness — Article 310 of the Criminal Act

The key issue in defamation by stating facts is whether the ground excluding unlawfulness under Article 310 of the Criminal Act applies.

Article 310 of the Criminal Act provides that “where an act under Article 307(1) is a true fact and solely concerns the public interest, it is not punished” (Criminal Act, Article 310).

A. The truthfulness requirement

Examining the purport of the entire content of the fact stated, it is enough that the important part accords with objective fact, and it does not matter if there is a slight difference from the truth in the details or a somewhat exaggerated expression (Seoul Southern District Court, July 2, 2024, 2023gojeong1140). Moreover, even where the fact stated is not true, unlawfulness is excluded where the actor had substantial reason to believe it to be true (Ulsan District Court, Jan. 10, 2025, 2023godan494; Supreme Court, Aug. 26, 1994, 94do237).

B. The public-interest requirement

“Where it solely concerns the public interest” means that the fact stated, viewed objectively, concerns the public interest, and that the actor too subjectively stated the fact for the public interest. The public interest here includes not only the interest of the state, society, or other general unspecified persons, but also matters concerning the concern and interest of a particular social group or its members as a whole. If the actor’s principal motive or purpose is for the public interest, the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act cannot be excluded even where another private-interest purpose or motive is incidentally contained (Seoul Southern District Court, July 2, 2024, 2023gojeong1140; Seoul Eastern District Court, June 15, 2023, 2022gojeong810; Ulsan District Court, Jan. 10, 2025, 2023godan494).

C. The limited scope of application of Article 310

Article 310 of the Criminal Act applies only to Article 307(1) (defamation by stating facts), and does not apply to the offense of defamation by stating false facts (Article 307(2)), defamation of the dead (Article 308), defamation through printed materials, etc. (Article 309), or the offense of insult (Article 311) (Supreme Court, Apr. 13, 1993, 92do234).

4. Conclusion — When Stating a Fact Is Punished Even So

In the end, even where a true fact is stated, one is punished for the offense of defamation if all of the following requirements are satisfied.

Requirement	Content
Publicity	A state in which an unspecified or large number of persons can perceive it (including the possibility of propagation)
Statement of a fact	A report or statement about a concrete factual relationship, which can be proved
Concreteness	To the degree that a particular person’s social evaluation has the possibility of being infringed
Intent	Perception of the defamatory result (conditional intent suffices)
Absence of a ground excluding unlawfulness	Lacking even one of the requirements—a true fact + solely the public interest

5. Recent Judgments

A. Seoul Southern District Court, July 2, 2024, 2023gojeong1140 (acquittal). An auditor of an apartment residents’ representative council stated, at the building-representatives’ meeting, misconduct by the management office head and the victim. The court found that the fact stated was a true fact and, concerning the common interest of the apartment residents, was solely for the public interest, judged that unlawfulness was excluded under Article 310 of the Criminal Act, and acquitted.

B. Seoul Northern District Court, Dec. 6, 2023, 2023gojeong320 (a fine of KRW 2 million). The defendant, a member of a clan, sent a certified-content mail to clan members stating facts about the clan head and the secretary. The court found that what the defendant stated constituted the statement of a fact, and that—given that the defendant criminally complained against the victims and stated at the investigative agency that he “disliked” the victims—it was not for the purpose of the public interest; it therefore did not recognize the Article 310 ground excluding unlawfulness and convicted (a fine of KRW 2 million).

C. Gwangju District Court, May 9, 2024, 2023no1035 (appeal dismissed). The defendant posted on his blog, indicating the victim’s real name, writing to the effect that the victim had worked in the entertainment-bar industry. The court found that, the defendant having posted while vaguely thinking it was true without going through any fact-confirmation procedure, there was no objective and reasonable basis for believing it to be true; it therefore did not recognize a ground excluding unlawfulness and the conviction became final.

D. Ulsan District Court, Jan. 10, 2025, 2023godan494 (acquittal). In a case prosecuted as defamation by stating false facts, the court found there was no proof that the fact stated was false, and so examined the offense of defamation by stating facts on its own authority; it judged that the Article 310 ground excluding unlawfulness was recognized and acquitted. In this judgment, the court reaffirmed the principle that the “where it solely concerns the public interest” requirement of Article 310 is relaxed, so that if the actor’s principal motive is for the public interest, its application cannot be excluded even where there is an incidental private-interest purpose.

E. Jeju District Court, Nov. 27, 2024, 2024gojeong143 (a fine of KRW 1.5 million, suspended for 1 year). The defendant, in the midst of a divorce suit, made known—via a KakaoTalk profile and by telephoning acquaintances—the fact that his wife had filed a suit in connection with an affair. The court found that this part constituted the statement of a true fact and could not be regarded as for the public interest, and convicted (a fine of KRW 1.5 million, suspended for 1 year).

In summary, even where a true fact is stated, one is punished for the offense of defamation where (1) publicity, (2) the statement of a concrete fact, and (3) intent are recognized, and (4) the truthfulness + public-interest requirements of Article 310 of the Criminal Act are not all satisfied. In particular, a statement of facts made for private feelings or personal interest often fails to satisfy the public-interest requirement, so that unlawfulness is not excluded.

Standards for Judging “Public Interest” Under Article 310 of the Criminal Act

1. The Basic Legal Principle

The fact stated must, viewed objectively, concern the public interest, and the actor too must subjectively have stated the fact for the public interest; what concerns the public interest includes not only what broadly concerns the interest of the state, society, or other general unspecified persons, but also what concerns the concern and interest of a particular social group or its members as a whole. Whether the fact stated concerns the public interest must be determined by considering the various circumstances of the expression itself—the content and nature of the fact, the scope of the party to whom the fact was published, the manner of expression, and the like—while at the same time comparing and considering the degree of infringement of the honor that is or may be harmed by the expression; and if the actor’s principal motive or purpose is for the public interest, the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act cannot be excluded even where another private-interest purpose or motive is incidentally contained. (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Supreme Court, June 8, 1999, 99do1543; Supreme Court, Oct. 25, 1996, 95do1473)

2. The Specific Standards the Courts Consider

A. The objective element — the public nature of the fact stated itself

The court judges whether the fact stated objectively concerns the public interest by considering the following comprehensively (Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 2005, 2005do5068; Supreme Court, Apr. 26, 2007, 2007do1525).

Factor considered	Specific content
The victim’s status	Whether a public official or public figure, or merely a private person
The public/social nature of the expression	Whether it is a matter of public concern with the public and social nature the public ought to know, contributing to the formation of public opinion or open debate, or whether it belongs to a purely private sphere
Whether the victim invited the risk	Whether the victim himself invited the risk of the defamatory expression
The degree of infringement of honor	The nature of the honor that is or may be harmed by the expression, and the degree of infringement
The manner and motive of expression	The manner of expression, the scope of the party, and the actor’s motive

(Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Supreme Court, Apr. 28, 2022, 2020do15738)

B. The subjective element — the actor’s motive and purpose

It is enough that the actor’s principal motive or purpose is for the public interest, and the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act cannot be excluded even where a private-interest purpose or motive is incidentally contained (Supreme Court, Oct. 25, 1996, 95do1473; Supreme Court, June 8, 1999, 99do1543; Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425). That is, notwithstanding the word “solely,” the precedents do not interpret it strictly and consistently maintain the position that an incidental private interest does not matter so long as the principal motive lies in the public interest.

C. The expansion of the scope of “public interest” — the trend of recent precedents

The Supreme Court has recently interpreted the scope of “public interest” more broadly.

Even if the content of the fact stated is a matter related to only a partial interest of society at large, if it is a matter related to communal life with other ordinary people, it has a public nature; and even a matter concerning an individual, if it is related to the public interest and obtains or can obtain social concern, is not to be excluded from the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act merely on the ground that it does not directly concern the interest of the state or society at large, or a particular social group. Even for a private person, whether it relates to the public interest must be judged by weighing the nature of the social activity in which he is involved and its impact on society. (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Supreme Court, Apr. 28, 2022, 2020do15738)

The Seoul Northern District Court also held that “considering that the concept of relatedness to the public interest changes with the times, and that matters of public concern likewise change ceaselessly with circumstances, relatedness to the public interest is not to be limited to that concerning public figures, institutions, policies, and the like” (Seoul Northern District Court, Nov. 24, 2023, 2023gojeong253).

Even a fact concerning an individual’s private personal matters may, depending on the nature of the social activity in which he is involved and his influence on society, be regarded as concerning the public interest (Supreme Court, Apr. 12, 1996, 94do3309).

3. Practical Standards for Distinguishing Personal Interest from Public Interest

A. Types of cases where the public interest was recognized

Type of case	Basis for the judgment
An auditor of an apartment residents’ representative council stating, at the building-representatives’ meeting, misconduct by the management office head and a building representative	A matter concerning the common interest of the apartment residents
Informing the members of a religious organization of internal misconduct facts	A public interest closely related to the maintenance and activity of the organization (Daejeon District Court, Oct. 30, 2014, 2014no1318)
Stating, before the members of a rotating-credit association, the fact that the organizer used the pooled money arbitrarily	A matter concerning the concern and interest of the members as a whole (Gwangju District Court, Aug. 12, 2015, 2014no3180)
Stating facts about a candidate in connection with an association chair election	A matter concerning the concern and interest of the association members as a whole (Supreme Court, Apr. 11, 1997, 97do88)
Informing the members of an internet cafe of misconduct facts about the cafe operator	A matter concerning the concern and interest of the cafe members as a whole (Seoul Southern District Court, Nov. 9, 2022, 2022gojeong814)
Informing the cooperative members of the cooperative head’s record of criminal punishment	A matter of public concern with the public and social nature the cooperative members ought to know (Chuncheon District Court, Wonju Branch, Nov. 15, 2018, 2017gojeong336)

B. Types of cases where the public interest was denied

Type of case	Basis for denial
Distributing leaflets criticizing the other party against the background of a dispute between individuals	A purpose of disparagement based on a personal dispute was the principal motive (Busan District Court, Oct. 30, 2015, 2015no2794)
Where the principal purpose was to disparage by highlighting the victim’s criminal record	Highlighting the criminal record being the principal purpose, the public interest was denied (Changwon District Court, Oct. 13, 2016, 2016gojeong320)
Leaflets for a personal purpose, to criticize the other party during a defect-repair dispute	A personal purpose was the principal motive (Daejeon District Court, May 17, 2017, 2016no2519)
Posting a private person’s personal information (face, workplace, family relations, etc.) for the purpose of increasing blog visitor numbers	The victim not being a public figure, and the private-interest purpose of increasing blog visitor numbers being the principal motive (Daegu District Court, June 4, 2025, 2025gojeong130)
Where the actor criminally complained against the victim or stated at the investigative agency that he “disliked” the victim	Personal feelings, not the public interest, were the principal motive
Informing apartment residents of a bodily-injury case between individuals	A personal dispute unrelated to the interest of the apartment residents as a whole or to the public interest (Busan District Court, Aug. 12, 2015, 2015gojeong733, 1776 (consolidated))

C. The key judgment points in practice

The points the court regards as most important when judging the public interest in practice may be summarized as follows.

1) Whether the victim is a public figure or a private person

Where the victim is a public official or public figure, recognition of the public interest is much easier. By contrast, where the victim is a purely private person, the nature of his social activity and his influence on society must be examined separately (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425).

2) Whether the content of the expression is a matter of public concern or a private sphere

The key standard is whether the expression concerns a matter of public concern that contributes to the formation of public opinion or open debate, or whether it belongs to a purely private sphere (Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 2005, 2005do5068). In particular, a statement of facts arising from a dispute between individuals strongly tends to have the public interest denied.

3) The necessity and appropriateness of the manner and scope of expression

Even if it is for the public interest, where the victim’s personal information is excessively disclosed beyond the scope necessary to achieve that purpose, or a disparaging expression is used, the public interest may be denied. For example, in Daegu District Court, June 4, 2025, 2025gojeong130, disclosing—while posting writing on a matter of public concern—even the victim’s face photograph, workplace name, assigned duties, family relations, and the trade name of the parents’ place of business was regarded as exceeding the scope necessary for the public interest, and the public interest was denied (Daegu District Court, June 4, 2025, 2025gojeong130).

4) The actor’s principal motive and purpose

Where the actor criminally complained against the victim or expressed hostility toward the victim at the investigative agency, or where the content of the expression contains many disparaging phrases, the principal motive is judged to lie in personal feelings or disparagement rather than the public interest (Daegu District Court, Apr. 8, 2016, 2015gojeong2338; Daegu District Court, July 6, 2023, 2022gojeong780).

4. Conclusion

In the end, judging the “public interest” under Article 310 of the Criminal Act proceeds around four axes: (1) whether the victim is a public figure; (2) whether the fact stated amounts to a matter of public concern; (3) the appropriateness of the manner and scope of expression; and (4) the actor’s principal motive and purpose. The consistent position of the courts is that the conclusion is not reached by any one of these factors alone, but is determined by comparing and considering all the circumstances comprehensively (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Supreme Court, Oct. 25, 1996, 95do1473).

III. The Relaxed Interpretation of “Solely” (오로지)

1. Framing the Issue

Article 310 of the Criminal Act provides that “where an act under Article 307(1) is a true fact and solely concerns the public interest, it is not punished” (Criminal Act, Article 310). On its text, “solely” could be read to mean that the public interest must be the only motive. The Supreme Court, however, does not interpret it strictly, but relaxes it to mean the “principal motive.” This guide examines the constitutional basis from which this interpretation arises, and how it harmonizes with recent Constitutional Court precedent.

2. The Relaxed Reading of “Solely” — the Consistent Position of the Supreme Court

A. The content of the relaxed reading

The Supreme Court has consistently held on the meaning of “where it solely concerns the public interest” as follows.

If the actor’s principal motive or purpose is for the public interest, the application of Article 310 of the Criminal Act cannot be excluded even where another private-interest purpose or motive is incidentally contained. (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Supreme Court, Oct. 25, 1996, 95do1473; Supreme Court, Nov. 10, 1995, 94do1942)

That is, “solely” is interpreted not to mean that the public interest must be the only motive, but to mean that it is enough that the public interest is the principal motive. Nor must the public interest be superior to the private interest.

B. The theoretical basis of the relaxed reading

The theoretical basis on which the Supreme Court relaxes “solely” lies in the legislative purpose of Article 310 of the Criminal Act. The Supreme Court regards this provision as seeking the harmony of two conflicting legal interests—the protection of an individual’s honor as a personality right, and the guarantee of legitimate freedom of expression under Article 21 of the Constitution. From this standpoint of harmony, if “solely” were interpreted on its text, freedom of expression could be excessively chilled; so it accords with the balance between the two legal interests that, where the principal motive lies in the public interest, unlawfulness is excluded even if there is an incidental private interest.

Scholarship, too—the majority view and the precedents agreeing—interprets “solely” in the sense of “principally.”

C. The expansion of the scope of the public interest

Furthermore, the Supreme Court interprets the scope of the public interest itself broadly.

The Supreme Court’s consistent position is thus to recognize the public-interest requirement as broadly as possible, and in practice the cases in which the public interest was denied and the application of Article 310 refused—in matters involving the media—are an extremely small minority.

3. How the Balance Between Freedom of Expression and the Protection of Honor Is Achieved

A. The constitutional status of the two legal interests

Freedom of expression (Constitution, Article 21) and the right to honor (the personality right under Article 10 of the Constitution) are both constitutional fundamental rights, and neither is in absolute superiority. The Constitutional Court has held that comparing and balancing these two fundamental rights to determine which stands superior is a matter of constitutional evaluation (Constitutional Court, Dec. 26, 2013, 2009heonma747).

B. How the relaxed reading of “solely” achieves the balance

Relaxing “solely” to the “principal motive” achieves the balance between the two legal interests in the following ways.

1) Contribution on the side of freedom of expression

In reality, an expression purely for the public interest alone scarcely exists. Most acts of expression mix personal feelings, private-interest motives, competitive interests, and the like. If “solely” were interpreted on its text, in effect the ground excluding unlawfulness would scarcely be recognized, with the risk that freedom of expression would be hollowed out. The relaxed reading prevents this risk and substantively guarantees free expression on matters of public concern.

In particular, the Daejeon District Court, in a recent judgment, expressly confirmed this trend, holding that “considering the background of the recent discussions on abolishing, or narrowing the scope of, the offense of defamation by stating facts, in judging the ‘public interest’ as opposed to a ‘purpose of disparaging a person,’ it is undesirable to judge it very strictly unless the fact stated concerns a hidden secret of private life or sensitive personal information” (Daejeon District Court, Apr. 3, 2025, 2024godan2880).

2) Setting limits on the side of protecting honor

On the other hand, the relaxed reading is not unlimited. Because the requirement that the “principal motive” be the public interest is still maintained, unlawfulness is not excluded where the principal motive lies in personal disparagement or the pursuit of private interest. Through this, the minimum of honor protection is secured.

For example, the Busan District Court, Seobu Branch, in a case of posting a notice about an apartment management office head, found that the defendant’s principal intent was not the public interest of informing the residents but to express to the victim an intent to dismiss him; it therefore denied the exclusion of unlawfulness and convicted (Busan District Court, Seobu Branch, Apr. 16, 2024, 2023gojeong638). The Seoul Southern District Court also denied the exclusion of unlawfulness where the act of posting a banner was judged to be a means of obtaining money from the victim rather than for a public-interest purpose (Seoul Southern District Court, Oct. 6, 2023, 2023godan233, 2023godan1414 (consolidated)).

3) Differentiated protection according to the victim’s status

The relaxed reading applies in a differentiated way according to whether the victim is a public figure or a private person. For an expression about a public figure’s public activity, the public nature is recognized more easily; whereas for an expression about a private person’s purely private sphere, recognition of the public nature is strict. This accords with the Constitutional Court’s holding that “there should be a difference in the constitutional standard of review according to whether the victim of the defamatory expression is a public figure or a private person, and whether the expression concerns a matter of public concern or belongs to a purely private sphere, and the restriction on defamatory expression about a public figure’s public activity should be more relaxed” (Constitutional Court, Dec. 26, 2013, 2009heonma747).

4. Harmony with Recent Constitutional Court Precedent

A. Comparison with the ground excluding unlawfulness under the Public Official Election Act

The Supreme Court interprets the “solely” of Article 310 of the Criminal Act and the ground excluding unlawfulness in the proviso to Article 251 of the Public Official Election Act distinctly. The proviso to Article 251 of the Public Official Election Act deleted the word “solely”; this was to sufficiently guarantee the freedom of election campaigning and to provide voters with sufficient information about candidates. In the case of the proviso to the Public Official Election Act, even where the public interest has not become a motive superior to the private interest, unlawfulness is excluded if both exist simultaneously and appropriateness is recognized therein (Supreme Court, June 28, 1996, 96do977). Thus the relaxed reading of Article 310 of the Criminal Act is stricter than the proviso to the Public Official Election Act, but takes an intermediate position more relaxed than the reading on its text.

B. Harmony with the Constitutional Court’s principle of guaranteeing freedom of expression

The Constitutional Court emphasizes that freedom of expression is “a means of free self-realization of personality and at the same time a means of rational and constructive opinion-formation and the discovery of truth, a fundamental right indispensable to the existence and development of a democratic state” (Constitutional Court, Apr. 25, 2024, 2021heonma1258). The Constitutional Court also, while holding that “the restriction on defamatory expression about a public figure’s public activity should be more relaxed,” sets a limit on honor protection, stating that “even an expression concerning a public figure or a matter of public concern—a clear false fact exceeding the range of exaggeration permitted at an everyday level, a malicious attack on an individual or one that markedly loses appropriateness—should be capable of being restricted” (Constitutional Court, Dec. 26, 2013, 2009heonma747).

The relaxed reading of “solely” harmonizes precisely with this position of the Constitutional Court. That is, it is a structure that (1) substantively guarantees freedom of expression on matters of public concern, while (2) securing the minimum of honor protection by denying the exclusion of unlawfulness where the principal motive lies in disparagement or private interest.

C. The Seoul High Court’s express confirmation

The Seoul High Court confirmed this harmony even more expressly in a case of defamation of a superior.

Considering legislative examples such as Article 193 of the German Criminal Code, the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee, and harmony with freedom of expression, in the case of stating a true fact the “public interest” of Article 310 of the Criminal Act, too, should be recognized more broadly. (Seoul High Court, Sept. 13, 2023, 2023no43)

This shows that the relaxed reading of “solely” is justified also from the standpoint of harmony with international human-rights standards.

5. Conclusion

Category	Content
Content of the relaxed reading	“Solely” = it is enough that the public interest is the principal motive; an incidental private interest is permitted
Constitutional basis	The harmonious balancing of freedom of expression (Constitution, Article 21) and the right to honor (Constitution, Article 10)
How balance is achieved	Substantive guarantee of freedom of expression + denial of the exclusion of unlawfulness where the principal motive is disparagement
Harmony with Constitutional Court precedent	Relaxed restriction on expression about a public figure’s public activity + malicious attacks may be restricted
Limits	The exclusion of unlawfulness is denied for a private person’s purely private sphere, or where the principal motive is disparagement or private interest

In the end, the relaxed reading of “solely” is an interpretation faithful to the legislative purpose of Article 310 of the Criminal Act—a provision seeking the harmony of two constitutional values, freedom of expression and the right to honor. It accords with the importance of freedom of expression that the Constitutional Court emphasizes and with the principle of relaxing restrictions on expression about public figures, while providing a point of balance that secures the minimum of honor protection (Supreme Court, Feb. 2, 2023, 2022do13425; Constitutional Court, Dec. 26, 2013, 2009heonma747).

Thank you for reading!